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ABSTRACT 
 
The models outlined in this essay were basically put together to help economists analyze household 
behavior and subsequently propose government policies for poverty reduction. From the arguments 
posed in the above text, it is clear that government policies should not be based solely on the 
unitary model because of its failure to analyze intra household relationships and resource 
distribution. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE CONCEPT OF 
HOUSEHOLD IN DEVELOPMENT 
 
“Don’t ask me what poverty is because you have 
met it outside my house. Look at the house and 
count the number of holes. Look at the utensils and 
the clothes I am wearing. Look at everything and 
write what you see. What you see is poverty” (Poor 
Man in Kenya, cited in Todaro and Smith, 2003, 
pp:10). In order to address, reduce and abolish 
poverty the concept of “development” has emerged 
as a discipline which is concerned with enhancing 
the lives and freedom of people-people like this 
poor man in Kenya (Sen, 1999). The fundamental 
goal of development is to generate sustainable 
social and economic progress. The ways in which 
this can be done have been subject to much debate 
and research for many years, resulting in some 
improvement in interpreting the connections 
between development projects and development 
itself (Rogers, 1990). This progress has built on the 
simpler model of the relationship between 
economic growth of a country and the well being 
of its citizens and there is an increasing recognition 
of the importance of addressing inequalities by 
specifically targeting disadvantaged groups (see 
World Development Report, 2000). One step in 
this progression has been the questioning of 
conventional approaches to describing one of the 
most important units of development analysis- the 
household.  
 
Households, considered to be the smallest social 
units, play a vital role in the organization of 
information in case of census, surveys for 
collection of technical and socio-economic data, 
diagnosis and solutions of farming problems and 
most importantly, in the planning and targeting of 
poverty and nutrition interventions (Evans 1989). 
Household information is increasingly being 
recognized as having central importance within the 
field of development. Power, positions, 
relationships, asymmetries, inequalities, 
dependence within a household are all fundamental 
aspects of issues such as access to resources, their 
allocation and control, decision making and 
bargaining. Household relations are predominantly 
culture-specific, essentially constructed by society 
in accordance to expectations and practices 
connected to factors such as gender, generation, 
kinship or an individual’s relationship to the 
household head (Roberts, 1991). They are 
therefore dynamic rather than static, changing with 
time and in response to external influences, 
developments and shocks. Only by understanding 
these dynamics, practitioners accurately identify 
who will be the ultimate beneficiaries of certain 
developments and who will lose out. 
 
II. DEFINING NEO CLASSICAL 
ECONOMIC MODELS OF HOUSEHOLD 
 
In order to study the features of actual households 
for a wide range of diagnostic and predictive 
purposes (e.g. household responses to market wage 
rate, household demand for commodities and 
public services), economists and development 
experts have come up with different household 
economic models. Through these models, human 
behavior is analyzed for different contexts, so that 
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the closest possible representation of reality can be 
achieved.  
 
The models were developed with the ultimate 
objective of working out what constitutes a 
household, how and why resources are allocated 
between the members, how individual utilities are 
satisfied and how social welfare can be maximized 
as it is believed that intra-household interactions 
can eventually have impacts on the overall 
economy and social welfare of people and 
economists can subsequently suggest government 
policies for development based on the models 
formulated. In the process, it has been assumed 
that the household is a single unit and that 
resources are shared fairly within it - an idea based 
on neo-classical economics, which conceptualized 
households as rational actors. Households were 
modeled as optimizers who were led to "better" 
outcomes. The neoclassical economic models are 
based on three assumptions 1. People have rational 
preferences among outcomes. 2. Individuals 
maximize utility and firms maximize profits. 3. 
People act independently on the basis of full and 
relevant information (Weintraub, undated). Such 
interpretation of households dominated developing 
thinking for decades. The major reason for such 
domination is the fact that, prior to the 1970s, 
development was nearly always seen as economic 
phenomenon in which overall growth will trickle 
down to the masses in the form of employment and 
other economic opportunities. To get the growth 
job done, the micro and macro economic theories 
of traditional neo classical economics were applied 
and households were also part of this widespread 
treatment (Todaro and Smith, 2003)!   
 
If the household models of micro-economic theory 
are looked at, they mostly consider the household 
to have a single utility function, which obscures 
the fact that, in households, some lose and others 
gain even where aggregate utility increases e.g. 
selling the car for eldest child’s university 
education. However, such economic approaches 
towards and assumptions about the household have 
been the basis upon which policies have been 
designed and implemented for years, which as 
Kabeer (1994) highlights “explains why women’s 
needs and interest have so often been overlooked 
by policymakers” (p:16). Although, in time, as 
development changed its focus from quantitative to 
qualitative progress due to failure of economic 
approaches to change the lives of the masses of 
people, the refinement of the models recognized 
the underlying that inequalities between gender 
exist within households. However, it has been seen 
that new the models still lack the ability to fully 
examine intra-household relationships, particularly 
those related to gender differences.  
 
The focus and primary concern of the chief 
criticism directed towards the neo classical 
household models is the weak interaction between 
economic theory, genuine problems, and the 
policies formulated to solve these issues. Often the 
models have no contact with actual events thus 
making them useless in extreme cases. The 
theoretical lenses of these models are often based 
on inaccurate assumptions. They shape and limit 
the insights of the practitioners working on 
development into the nature of social reality thus 
preventing them seeing the full picture with clarity. 
By not anticipating the dynamics of intra-
household relations and their implications, 
practitioners risk the development of the 
beneficiaries both directly and indirectly. This 
triggers negative consequences such as increasing 
male bias in agricultural policy and the consequent 
subordination of women, keeping them isolated in 
reproductive work and economically dependent.  
 
The aim of this paper is briefly to describe the neo-
classical economics of household models outlining 
both those of unitary behavior and that of 
collective nature. Then empirical studies will be 
used to assess whether the models are effective 
representations of real life household behavior. 
This paper will pursue a critical approach to the 
basis in which unitary models have been created 
and how subsequent collective models, mainly 
bargaining models, have questioned the credibility.  
 
Through this paper, some of the controversial 
issues regarding neo-classical economic models of 
households will be reviewed, using mainly 
feminist approaches as it is from this point of view 
that neo classical household models have been 
most extensively challenged (Folbre, 1989). In 
spite of the critique, a well-designed alternative to 
the traditional model is yet to be presented by 
economists but this paper will focus on the 
imaginative consequences of a critical analysis.  
 
III. CONVENTIONAL FEATURES OF 
HOUSEHOLDS 
 
Before embarking into the debates surrounding 
household modeling, it is important to briefly 
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define the conventional features of households. In 
order to provide “a radical solution to the problem 
of general applicability of conclusions from one 
area to another” the concept of household has 
arisen (Guyer and Peters, 1987, cited in Johnson, 
1988:2). Although there does not exist a 
universally accepted definition of households, they 
can be described as units of biological 
reproduction, as property owning entities or as 
initiators of a labor process. Whichever the 
description, its product become inputs into 
household consumption which, according to 
Becker (1979), centers around ‘one pot’ and under 
‘one roof’ (Edholm, Harris and Young, 1977, cited 
in Johnson, 1988:3). However, it is very difficult 
to define the boundaries of a household. For 
example, how can all consumption be 
accommodated into the one pot and how can the 
heterogeneous members with individual natures 
and utility functions be described under one roof? 
The diversity of household structures within a 
given society is moreover, essential to be noted 
(Gastellu, 1987, cited in Johnson, 1988). 
 
In the economic sense, households may be defined 
as units of production and consumption although 
much of the definitions can be subject to cultural 
interpretation (Crehen, 1992). Essentially, 
households are not static over time, culture and 
communities; they evolve in response to the 
availability and allocation of resources and 
activities. In reality, the household fosters socio-
economic relationships between members so that 
both intra-household and inter-household 
relationships lead to economic and social benefits 
in the current location (Crehen, 1992).  
 
The different defining characteristics of 
households give modelers a choice over their 
assumptions about households (Evans, 1989). 
Models are often applied to learn how (or whether) 
individual utilities are fulfilled in households and 
what collective goal is binding the members 
together. The goals of these models are to portray 
the characteristics of collective choice within the 
households because this type of choice offers 
simplicity to policy makers. The model of 
collective choice can be used to examine a wide 
variety of issues without collecting large amount 
of time consuming and costly additional 
information about each individual’s preferences. 
The models enable policy makers to leave the issue 
of internal distribution often assuming that it will 
take place fairly, collectively and equally or that 
interventions have equal impacts on both men and 
women (Bruce and Dwyer, 1989). 
 
IV. UNITARY MODEL OF HOUSEHOLDS 
 
The simplest form of a hypothetical household is 
the unitary model which is very easy to define and 
has prevailed as a widely applied representation of 
resource and labor time distribution within a 
household. There are no complications involved 
with this form of modeling as all members are 
assumed to have common preferences, thus 
resulting in a conflict-free family. 
 
The unitary household model assumes that all 
household members jointly make decisions to 
maximize their collective interest (Ellis, 1988). 
Every individual has exactly the same preferences 
and utility function as the other members of the 
household, thus making it act as a single unit. Such 
households are characterized by the pooling of 
resources, the absence of conflict and overall 
collective utilities-which enable complete social 
harmony (Matilla, 1999). 
 
Beckerian New Household Economic Theory: A 
Critical Outlook 
 
Based on the unitary model, Gary Becker 
conceptualized the New Household Economic 
(NHE) Theory as an alternative model to the 
traditional consumer theory1. The Beckerian 
household is said to be the most complete 
presentation of the unitary household model 
(Matilla, 1999). Becker (1979) used an economic 
approach that take into account the nature in which 
human behavior is driven by a rich set of values, 
norms and of course, the basic urge to live 
collectively. Household decision-making regarding 
marriage, divorce, the division of labor, investment 
in children and so on, is done using the rational 
choice approach2 in this model. It treats the 
household as a consumption unit with a defined 
                                                 
1. Consumer theory is the starting point of all neo-
classical household economic theories. It is based on 
the hypothesis that one individual -one consumer unit 
of analysis maximizes his utility by using market 
goods and services, subject to his income constraint 
and all economic preferences are guided by self 
interest (Matilla, 1999). 
2. This approach assumes that people engage in 
maximizing collective benefits and approach all 
things in the same way, evaluating costs and benefits 
and acting as to maximize their net benefits (Becker, 
1979). 
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joint utility function, thus moving away from the 
more familiar domain of individual utility 
maximization in traditional consumer theory. In 
fact, Becker argues that the rational choice 
approach is a comprehensive method applicable to 
all human behavior (Matilla, 1999). Although the 
model offers straightforwardness in understanding 
the household, over the years, absence of certain 
‘real world’ elements of household behavior in the 
model has led to major criticism about Becker’s 
theory. Folbre (1986) claims that the unitary 
economic models are rarely, if ever, validated in 
any way or based on any empirical research. As a 
result, they constantly fail to differentiate the 
activities that go on within the household mainly 
by gender and power inequalities. 
 
In Becker’s model, a household is presented as a 
contained social and economic entity with clearly 
defined boundaries. It is organized independent of 
other households and actors in the economy. The 
family is considered the basic labor unit and the 
household has a strong connotation of co-residence 
(Evans, 1989). In reality however, households are 
more often shifting flexible structures with 
boundaries that are difficult to discern. Micro 
studies from Sub-Saharan Africa show a great 
diversity of family and household composition and 
social relations, mediated through marriage and 
kinship, creating a variety of residential 
arrangements (Evans, 1991). Furthermore, 
important information concerning variations in 
household composition, for example, by gender, 
age and kinship, is lost where households are 
considered a single legal union and unified 
economic entity. For example, polygamous 
households will probably comprise of a number of 
separated but inter-related household units in 
which many decisions are taken by co-wives with 
or without the involvement of their husbands 
(Evans, 1989).   
 
The model suggests that the production activities 
of the household are based on household labor 
alone, but this is not necessarily true. Whitehead 
and Kabeer (2001) underlined the importance of 
kinship obligations in providing labor to 
households. Within the households, there may also 
be different labor groups. For example, Crehen 
(1992) found among the Kaonde in north-western 
Zambia that the labor unit was a woman and her 
dependent children, who were not necessarily her 
biological children. Roberts (1991) in an 
anthropological study in Sub-Saharan Africa 
observes “households do not necessarily comprise 
persons recruited solely through kinship and 
marriage…..” (pp: 32).  
 
Regardless of how the household members are 
related / associated, Becker’s model indicates that 
there exists a single household utility function 
framed to fulfill a joint set of preferences as a 
unitary entity (Haddad and Kanbur, 1990). How 
can the joint utility be mapped from different 
individual choices? The solution can be to 
‘calculate’ aggregate preferences or an average 
utility function so that the new indicators show the 
level of wellbeing of the household as a whole, 
thus becoming a social welfare function. Even if 
multiple utility functions exist, they can each be 
labeled with a pre-determined weight and the 
welfare of the family can be equaled to the 
weighted sum of the net utility of all members 
(Sen, 1976, cited in Alderman 1995).  
 
Becker’s account is premised on each family 
acting as an economic unit, and this extent of 
harmony is possible when the household actions 
are being dictated by a single rational agent 
(typically, the male breadwinner), who optimally 
allocates resources among family members. 
Becker, in effect, proposes a tenet which is 
opposite to that which holds in the marketplace: 
the rational agent or dictator, in the family is 
perfectly altruistic and benevolent while in the 
marketplace, he is self interested (Wooley, 1996). 
However, he does not offer any answer to this 
question - why does altruism work at home and not 
in society at large, in which case social 
organization other than the free markets could 
achieve maximum social welfare (Ellis, 1988)? 
 
Becker in his theory talks about a common set of 
preferences, determined by the head of the family 
that lead to a joint utility function (Evans, 1989). 
However, the very assumption that household 
members have a common set of preferences is in 
reality, impractical. The fact remains that were a 
dictator to make the household decisions, the 
members could not behave voluntarily in 
preference maximization. Certain factors like 
violence, or its fear, maybe the means for forcing 
subordinate members to accept an assumed 
common good. In line with the saying, “the ends 
justify the means”, if violence becomes the means 
of acquiring the common good of the household, 
economic theories and models do not condemn it! 
Galbraith (1973) concluded very clearly that 
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although neo-classical economics resolves the 
problem of non-expression of individual 
personality and preferences, it does so by ignoring 
the subordination of individuals (mainly women) 
and inner relationships within the households.  
 
Becker’s assumption that the person controlling 
household income and resources is irrelevant (due 
to common preferences) is challenged by the fact 
that where women control income, the 
probabilities of child survival may rise by nearly 
twenty times (Study in Brazil by Thomas, 1990). 
Different household members have different 
preferences and obligations and therefore allocate 
the resources accordingly. For example, as part of 
a development project in Zambia, farmers were 
asked to intercrop beans (female crop) with maize 
(male crop) using machinery and oxen to prepare 
the land. Although the intention was to help 
women by saving their labor time and increasing 
their production, the female farmers contravened 
this practice because an increase in production 
made beans a cash crop and hence the income 
would fall completely into the hands of men 
(Feldstein and Poats, 1990, cited in Abbas, 1997). 
It is very interesting how the Zambian women 
preferred less production to “efficient” farming 
because the prevailing social circumstances would 
allow them to be in control only if their success is 
not significant enough to capture the male’s 
attention! This study once more, contradicts the 
theory of similarity of interest among the genders. 
Therefore, as opposed to the assumption of 
complete social harmony through which 
maximization of joint utility is attained within the 
household, this conflict of interest can even lead to 
inefficiencies in the household allocation of labor, 
with a corresponding failure to maximize 
agricultural intensification (Abbas, 1997).  
 
Folbre (1986) argued that joint utility functions 
disregard any form of inequality within households 
but in practice, household members do not 
necessarily enjoy equal access to resources and the 
benefits of production. Excess female infant and 
child mortality in South Asia, and higher 
enrolment and schooling completion rates of boys 
than girls in many African and Asian countries can 
be partly explained by the fact that in many 
societies, resources are preferentially directed to 
male members of the household (Hunte and 
Sulatan, 1987, cited in Goudge and Govender, 
2000). Often this is motivated by greater market 
opportunities for men because of enhanced levels 
of human capital, girls being more costly to raise 
and societal preferences. Therefore, evidence from 
Asia suggesting sex-bias in the distribution of 
food, health care and education within the 
household seriously questions the applicability of 
such notions of equitable distribution (Sen, 1987, 
cited in Johnson, 1988). Contrary to Becker’s 
(1979) assumption, Rogers (1990) states that 
incomes are not pooled or spent equally to meet 
the household’s needs, rather than they are spent in 
accordance with the earner’s weighted preferences. 
Furthermore, issues of intra-household 
inequalities, conflict or difference in household 
decision-making are completely ignored and 
bypassed when focus on distribution is across and 
not within households, even though the ‘within-
household’ distribution is central to individual 
welfare (Chiappori, 1992).  
 
Work carried out by Whitehead (1981) on poverty 
in North East Ghana found considerable 
differentiation in the poverty status of different 
women within a single household dependent on 
factors such as age and health status. The study 
found that, although some women were able to 
build up independent incomes and protect their 
assets, their chances were highly contingent on 
obtaining resources from their husbands. 
Essentially, the study revealed that it was possible 
for women to be poor in relatively rich households 
(cited in Baden 1992). Therefore, under biased 
availabilities of resources, including food and 
access to health care, even if the household was 
above the income poverty line, when 
disaggregated, it would be classified as below the 
poverty line in terms of consumption (Kabeer, 
1994). The household unitary model, due to its 
dependence on aggregate joint utility, fails to 
capture such reality. 
 
Although Becker (1979) recognizes the conflicts 
that exist between household members, the 
methodology and tools he uses to study material 
behavior are incapable of including this aspect. 
Nevertheless, according to him, altruism solves the 
various problems of distribution within a 
household. Despite the repeated emphasis on the 
notion of altruistic behavior within the Beckerian 
Household, many doubt his model is an accurate 
one because it fails to tally with women's 
individual and collective experience. They point to 
studies that demonstrate how women throughout 
the world are short-changed within the family on a 
systematic basis; in times of famine, women suffer 
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more from malnutrition than men and, on average 
women receive less of the household income 
without the compensation of greater leisure time. 
Feminist experts view these harsh realities as proof 
that perfect altruism within the family is anything 
but universal (Wooley, 1996), because women’s 
altruism is always taken for granted and listed 
among their obligations to the family.  
 
In Zimbabwe the fact that a man pays bride price 
gives him a claim to his wife’s labor as if she were 
his own ‘bought’ property (Kanji, 1995). Women 
in Nigeria and Ghana give more importance to 
their husbands’ crops than to their own fields, 
therefore decrementing their own productivity by 
leaving their fields unattended even at optimum 
times (Vankoppet, 1990, cited in Abbas, 1995). In 
all these case studies it is revealed that women are 
being altruistic and have no confusion about their 
utility functions. However, are these truly their 
own individual preferences or is it because they 
have absolutely no other alternatives in their male-
dominated societies? While being trapped within 
the imposed framework of social duties, the 
women may never even know whether the 
decisions are serving their own interest or not. 
Such circumstances contradict Becker’s hypothesis 
that decisions are made jointly to maximize 
collective interest. 
 
The developmental consequences of his theory are 
that although Becker (1979) has always recognized 
women’s subordination in patriarchal households 
within his argument of comparative advantage3, it 
is shocking how he provides no ideas or 
suggestions for improving the situation. Instead he 
relies on the power of patriarch as the main 
decision-maker to distribute labor time of the 
household members. The lack of attention to detail 
and inequalities within the household led to 
concerns regarding these assumptions, casting 
doubt on the validity of the unitary model of the 
household. Rogers (1990) states that worthwhile 
development projects that are based on such 
models can be rendered ineffective because their 
benefits can be lost by targeting the wrong person. 
                                                 
3. The household division of labor is explained in terms 
of comparative advantage. Given market differentials 
between men and women, a household division of 
labor in which women work within the household 
while men work for a wage outside, it is considered to 
be both functional and efficient for household welfare 
maximization (Evans, 1989). 
There are many examples of projects which failed, 
or even had negative impact, due to an ignorance 
of what goes on inside the household and a 
presumption that benefits will be evenly 
distributed. Ellis (1988) states that agricultural 
development policy is largely biased towards men, 
with male household members always being 
approached to discuss new crops, new seeds and 
new technologies. For example in Gambia, rice 
production was traditionally under female control. 
However, with the introduction of new 
technologies, women became excluded from rice 
production, leaving men to take advantage of the 
higher returns to labor on the crop. So, as a result 
of considering that targeting men will benefit the 
entire household when introducing this technology, 
women lost control of the crop, the land it was 
grown on, the income it produced and also their 
labor rights, as they became obliged to work under 
the control of men (Abbas, 1997). UNDP (1995) 
claims that the focus on the male as the head of the 
household, prime decision-maker and therefore the 
target of agricultural policies is at fault for leaving 
females to be the last to benefit from projects or 
even be negatively affected. 
 
It is obvious that the non-transparent or ‘Black 
Box’ outlook of the unitary model ignores power 
position, asymmetric gender relations, inequalities 
and dependences within a household, all of which 
are fundamental aspects which contribute to the 
dynamics of a household (Kabeer, 1991). The 
justification for the tendency of many economists 
to use such models and create their own ‘unreal 
world’ is that the application of the unified model 
leads to simplicity and offers the policy makers 
flexibility through ignorance of issues within the 
households which they consider insignificant 
(Kurien, 1996) and which I have shown to be quite 
the opposite here. Apart from being simple, the 
unitary model is more practical in the sense that 
collective decisions are indeed made although how 
they are made and what internal distribution rules 
exist is not the concern of the analyst.  
 
V. COLLECTIVE MODELS OF 
HOUSEHOLDS 
 
If the house is indeed viewed as a Black Box, it 
will be necessary for analysts to avoid the 
generalizations associated with the model and 
consequently drift towards more accurate 
representations to cover the ‘highly diverse’ real 
world. The neo-classical refinement would 
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consider the household welfare function but with 
the modification that different household members 
may (and most probably) will have different 
preferences. The solution would be to use 
“collective models” as opposed to unitary ones so 
that households are not looked upon as a single 
decision making unit and the black box can be 
‘opened’ to study the actual proceedings of a so-
called ‘united’ household.  
 
Collective models (also called pluralistic decision-
making models within families) encompass factors 
that characterize individuals living collectively in a 
household (Bergstrom, 1997). In order to ensure 
the end result is realistic, the collective models of 
household behavior try to capture the different 
preferences, conflicts and inequalities evolving 
among the members of a household.  This is a 
contrast to the ‘black box’ scenario prevailing in 
the Beckerian model.  
Although both unitary and collective models aim 
towards the same goal- collective choice, the 
means by which it is achieved is more precise in 
the latter school of models, which also strive to 
illustrate the influence of social parameters, 
institutional variables and other external factors. 
Therefore, the collective models explicitly 
consider the household as a collective entity, but 
with more than one decision-making unit. These 
models concentrate on the question- how can 
individual, dissimilar preferences lead to a 
collective choice? (Alderman 1995:5) Nevertheless 
these models are still explicitly neo-classical ones 
and have descended from Becker’s theory of 
household behavior. They make use of the unitary 
models’ structure and just change some decision-
making rules from those apparent in the joint 
decision-making models (see figure-1 for a 
comparative illustration). 
 
Figure 1: Households’ Situations in Terms of Neo-Classical Economic Models 
 
Sample Household 
No of Members: Two key players (and x 
subordinates e.g. children) 
Products in Market: Bread and Wine 
Relationship between key players: Husband 
and Wife 
Monthly Income: 100 pounds 
Recent Government Policy: To direct child allowance to the wife instead of the husband. 
 
 
Collective Models can be classified into two 
categories: cooperative and non-cooperative. The 
cooperative models can again be of two main 
types- efficient cooperative and bargaining models.  
 
Bargaining Models 
 
Bargaining models4 recognize the probable 
                                                 
4. In this essay, the comparison of collective models and 
unitary ones will be carried out on the basis of the 
conflict among the household members due to 
difference in preferences and aims but assume that 
                                                                      
bargaining model. The other forms of collective 
models are not addressed as they are beyond the scope 
of the essay- they have been excluded due to lack of 
space and in order to expand the developmental 
implications of the models chosen. For more 
information on models not covered in this paper see 
Chiapori (1988), Chiapori (1992), Fortin and Lacroix 
(1997), Landberg and Pollak (1994). 
UNITARY (BECKERIAN) MODEL: 
 
Husband decides that 70 pounds are to
be spent on wine and the rest on bread. 
 
Wife: has no say and becomes altruistic
although she prefers bread. This
expenditure distribution applies for the
child allowance as well. 
BARGAINING MODEL: 
 
The wife is not happy with only 40 percent
of income and wants 50% now, or she will
not heat the bread or serve the wine. The
husband bargains too and they decide on a
55:45 sharing rule now. If they get child
allowance, they will bargain with each
other on what to spend it for. 
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the individual members had formed the household 
because social situations ensure that it is beneficial 
for each party to be a part of a family rather than 
being unattached (McElroy, 1990). The models 
also assume there are two actors within a 
household, thus contradicting the unitary model. 
Taking into account the difference in interest of the 
two members, bargaining models suggest the 
resultant bargaining which is stylized in terms of 
game theory5. Nash was the first to formulate the 
bargaining problem and provide a corresponding 
bargaining solution which can be applied to 
relationships like marriages. The members are 
undoubtedly willing to bargain because marriage is 
depicted here as a static bilateral monopoly with 
potential gains for both parties to remain united 
rather than to divorce (McElory, 1990).  
 
In simple terms, two people ‘cooperate’ in order to 
improve each of their position as compared to a 
situation in which they do not cooperate at all 
(Sen, 1985). In the absence of a dictator the 
differences in individual utility functions in a 
marriage are resolved through the bargaining 
process as if it were a cooperative game of two 
players. There are many determinants to the 
bargaining power including the manner in which 
both internal and external resources are controlled 
by each person. When individuals fail to 
cooperate, this situation is called the ‘fall back 
position’ which can indicate the termination of 
marriage or other relationships and in turn, lead to 
the ‘threat point’ of the model (McElory, 1990).  
 
The fundamental difference between bargaining 
models and unitary models is that the former give 
a ‘transparent’ view of decision-making within a 
household. However, it is also a fact that couples 
do not threaten each other with divorce every time 
they have a disagreement (Phipps and Burton, 
1995) and although women have always been 
responsible for a significant proportion of activity 
in household production this does not confirm 
equal decision making and bargaining power for 
them. According to Dreze and Sen (1995), 
                                                 
5. Game Theory is the mathematics of strategy. The 
primary theory is the Minimax Theorem which 
basically says that if all the players of a game play the 
best, using most rational strategy, the resulting 
outcome of the game is predictable (Turocy and 
Stengel, 2001). In case of bargaining models it is 
assumed that the result of such a game will be 
increased utility for both members. 
women’s relative capability deprivation6 can in 
reality, account for their relative weak bargaining 
power by inhibiting their freedom to exploit 
opportunities, for example, to enhance their human 
capital. The capability deprivation holds back their 
ability to be responsible for their own lives and 
able to perform their own decision-making (e.g. 
their labor and leisure allocation (Dreze and Sen, 
1995)).  
 
Nevertheless, bilateral monopoly situation can be 
conceptualized in all households (except when 
there are lots of members and generations) and the 
split of benefits can undoubtedly be solved to some 
extent by bargaining. As in the case of Jones’s 
(1983) study in North Cameroon, men and women 
have individual fields which they cultivate 
separately. Apart from that, the rice fields are 
mostly cultivated jointly by both spouses although 
the income from that is given to husbands for 
control and distribution. The first impression 
derived from this arrangement is that women are 
being exploited since they have limited or no 
bargaining power. However, as Jones (1983) 
discovers, women were bargaining over the level 
of wage that their husbands rewarded them. 
Women mainly used their ability to withdraw 
labor, either to their own sorghum field or to the 
labor marker, as a bargaining tool. However, 
economic and non-economic factors limit the 
extent to which bargaining can be performed. After 
all, it is not to women’s advantage to work on 
sorghum because the returns are lower and 
working too much as a wage labor is likely to 
produce a beating. This shows how non-economic 
factors in the terms of intra-household relations 
play a vital role in the economic position of 
women, making them unable to gain control of 
resources (Johnson, 1988). Such circumstances, 
where bargaining exists but never provides long 
term advantage to the weaker member, have been 
ignored by the model. Furthermore, women are 
seen to be ‘allowed to bargain’ only on limited 
areas of decision making. For example, they may 
have complete power to choose and bargain what 
will be served as the next meal but will the power 
have the same weight when deciding to give 
daughters’ education? In such a combination of 
cooperation and conflict, it is not only the 
economic factors but EEPs (extra environmental 
                                                 
6. Refers to the alternative combinations of functioning 
from which a person can chose (Dreze and Sen, 1995: 
10) 
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parameters) like social mobility of women which 
influence the bargaining outcome (Haddad and 
Kanbur, 1990). 
 
The development implications of this model is that 
in order to empower women with bargaining 
power, projects need to be launched to create 
employment opportunities for them. This can help 
them acquire skills and a better fall back position. 
One such example of a project is the micro credit 
program for women. It is assumed that access to 
credit can help them become self employed in 
activities of their choice. However, critics put 
forward the inability of micro credit programs in 
improving the bargaining power of women 
because although it is them who take loans, the 
men take decisions (Joshi, 1998). Where cash is 
culturally a male resource, it does not matter who 
brings it into the household-control rests in male 
hands (Johnson and Rogaly, 1997). Failure to hand 
over the loans to the husbands can result in 
domestic violence and even divorce. In such 
situations, although women contribute to the 
household income by obtaining the loan, it does 
not necessarily improve their bargaining power as 
the theory suggests. Therefore, there is no doubt 
that the customary determinants go hand in hand 
with the economic factors to determine the 
bargaining power of women. 
 
Bargaining models have also been criticized by 
Sen (1987) for assuming that the individual is in 
full command/knowledge of his/her independent 
utility function. Sen implies that individuals have 
‘perceived’ notions of interests and about their 
position in the bargaining process. He suggests that 
“conventions often act as barriers to seeking a 
more equable deal and sometimes mitigate against 
recognizing the spectacular lack of equity in the 
ruling arrangements” (cited in Johnson, 1988:3). 
In Burkina Faso, women have customarily one out 
of five days to attend their own fields but even that 
day maybe devoted to the husband’s field if he 
requires extra labor (Vankoppet, 1990, cited in 
Abbas, 1995). This means that cultural inhibitions 
in highly patriarchal societies confine women 
mainly in fulfilling obligations to their husbands 
and women hardly consider bargaining with the 
belief that the arrangement is for their own benefit 
(Ellis, 1988).   
 
Nevertheless, bargaining models of household 
behavior cater for those social aspects which are 
not analyzed through the unitary model. These 
include the nature of intra-family decision-making, 
elaboration of individual preferences and the 
existent multiple utility functions within one 
household. It is recognized that all human beings 
are unique and their individuality can be analyzed 
to study the economics that prevail inside a 
household. Bargaining models have in particular, 
addressed the gender perspective in household 
operation which has linked the representation 
better to the real world.  
 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The models outlined in this essay were basically 
put together to help economists analyze household 
behavior and subsequently propose government 
policies for poverty reduction. From the arguments 
posed in the above text, it is clear that government 
policies should not be based solely on the unitary 
model because of its failure to analyze intra 
household relationships and resource distribution. 
It assumes that all decisions will have equal impact 
on both men and women, in spite of the fact that 
households represent an arena of unequal material 
exchanges (Whitehead, 1981). On the other hand, 
bargaining models have been criticized for 
containing highly economist notions of bargaining 
and cooperation (i.e. through the game theory) 
ignoring non economic factors such as perceived 
notions of interests and cultural conventions.  
 
As evident in this essay, empirical findings of the 
contested history of neo-classical household 
economic models do not provide sufficient 
evidence in favor of one particular model. Each 
household model describes particular utility 
functions which are applicable in certain contexts 
and are geared towards specific purposes. In 
isolation, none of them can give us the complete 
representation of reality due to incorrect and 
unrealistic assumptions.   
 
Information overlooked by the household models 
regarding complex dynamics within the unit have 
huge bearing on poverty reduction strategies and 
ignoring them can result in reduced efficiency in 
attacking poverty, targeting of the least needy and 
failure to bring benefits to the whole household 
and society at large.  A household is never a 
complete entity unless the cultural context is taken 
into account but models fail to integrate these 
aspects in the description of households. However, 
failures of development projects based on the 
models cannot suggest the ruling out of the 
Jahan Chowdhury 
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advantages of using households as units of study- 
it will remain the best measure for development if 
the intricate features of intra household 
interactions are studied deeply and included in its 
definition. In fact, if the relevant assumptions of 
different household models are picked and 
combined keeping the limitations of the models in 
mind, one can gain a better understanding of how 
households function and interact. After all, the 
proper simulation of a household through a holistic 
approach can lead to the working out of a ‘full 
video’ of the intra household activities and this 
will in turn, help in increasing social welfare by 
enabling the most suitable targeted policy to be 
applied to  relevant samples. 
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